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Abstract
We develop a model of outsourcing and trade in service inputs where
the scope of tasks produced by both manufacturing ￿rms and service
providers is endogeneous. Manufacturing ￿rms have to perform a ￿xed
set of tasks in order to produce their ￿nal good but can decide to outsource
some of these tasks to service providers, which, contrary to manufacturers,
have the possibility to sell tasks to di⁄erent manufacturers and thereby
bene￿t from economies of scale in their task production. The key assump-
tion is that the marginal cost of a ￿rm (manufacturer or service provider)
increases in the scope of tasks performed inside the ￿rm: a ￿rm which spe-
cializes in a narrow scope of tasks is more productive. Working against
this incentive to produce as few tasks as possible ￿inhouse￿is a ￿xed cost
paid by each ￿rm. The model yields several new predictions about trade
liberalization and welfare as measured by aggregate productivity. An in-
crease in the size of an economy raises the scale of all ￿rms, facilitates
greater specialization and therefore raises each ￿rm￿ s productivity. The
model therefore generates gains from trade or larger market size through
a ￿specialization e⁄ect￿as opposed to the classical ￿variety e⁄ect￿usually
generated by models building on Dixit Stiglitz utility structures. Welfare
increases due to adjustments in task scope allowed by the emergence of
specialized service ￿rms. Detailed Swedish data on what tasks (or occu-
pations) are performed by workers is used to test this prediction. Indeed,
we ￿nd that manufacturing ￿rms in larger cities (controlling for ￿rm size)
perform fewer tasks inhouse than ￿rms in smaller cities.
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11 Introduction
￿The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and
the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it
is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the e⁄ects of
the division of labour.￿
￿To take an example, therefore, from a very tri￿ ing manufacture; but
one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice
of, the trade of the pin-maker. [.....] Each person, therefore, making
a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as
making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had
all wrought separately and independently, [.....] they certainly could
not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day.￿
(Adam Smith, ￿An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations￿ , Book I, Chapter I.)
The phenomenon of outsourcing has generated a great deal of attention in re-
cent years. Recent declines in information and communication costs have made
it increasingly possible for ￿rms to source their material and service inputs from
suppliers outside the ￿rm, be they located in the domestic economy or abroad.
However, the nature of outsourcing appears to be changing in some important
aspects. First, while the globalization of production networks has long involved
the outsourcing of manufactured inputs, it increasingly concerns outsourcing of
services, though still at quantitatively lower levels, see Amiti and Wei (2005).
Second, this shift towards service outsourcing goes hand in hand with the emer-
gence of ￿rms which specialize in providing one or a few particular services. A
typical example of domestic service outsourcing is a manufacturing company
which outsources part of its need for human resources tasks to a company spe-
cializing in recruiting sta⁄, the canteen to a catering ￿rm and the cleaning of
factories and o¢ ces to a cleaning company. Examples of foreign outsourcing
could involve the after sales services to call centres abroad or the development
of software to IT engineers abroad. One important implication of this new trend
is that, contrary to material inputs outsourcing which mainly involves trade in
intermediate goods, service outsourcing mainly involves trade in tasks. And this
outsourcing of tasks has the potential to raise aggregate productivity in coun-
tries by allowing ￿rms to focus on the tasks involving their core competencies.
Moreover, it appears as if larger economic areas sustain more specialized service
providers. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence of the existence of extremely
2specialized service providers in very large cities, something which is discussed
in detail by Chinitz (1961).
We develop in this paper an analytically solvable outsourcing model which
we believe focuses more speci￿cally on the outsourcing of services rather than
manufacturing inputs.1 In our model, the scope of tasks produced by both man-
ufacturing ￿rms and service providers is endogenous. We assume that the task
inputs required in the production of a manufacturing ￿rm￿ s good are arranged
along a line.2 However, manufacturers have the possibility to outsource some
tasks in order to reduce the scope of tasks they produce.3 Indeed, the narrower
the range of tasks performed ￿inhouse￿is, the more e¢ cient the ￿rm will be
in the performance of these tasks or, equivalently, the lower marginal cost the
￿rm will have. One reason could be that management and supervision becomes
more e¢ cient the less di⁄erent types of tasks it has to monitor. Downward
pressure on the optimal task scope of manufacturing ￿rms is therefore due to
this bene￿t of specialization but is costly since service providers will share the
surplus generated by production. Service providers, similarly, produce a range
of tasks and are also more e¢ cient the more narrow is their task scope. How-
ever, contrary to manufacturers, service providers do not have to produce the
full range of tasks and can therefore specialize in a more narrow range of tasks
and sell these tasks to manufacturers. They therefore bene￿t from economies
of scale from specialization. The gains from specialization for service providers
is bounded from below by the presence of ￿xed costs. The model yields several
new predictions. First, larger markets consist of more specialized ￿rms (both
manufacturers and service providers). This is due to economies of scale in the
service industry; more service providers can survive given the higher demand
and it becomes more pro￿table for manufacturers to outsource more tasks. Sec-
ond, aggregate productivity rises as producers become more e¢ cient. The model
therefore generates gains from trade or larger market size through a ￿special-
ization e⁄ect￿as opposed to the classical ￿variety e⁄ect￿usually generated by
1In our view, one key di⁄erence between outsourcing of services versus intermediate inputs
is that the outsourcing of services involves the explicit outsourcing of certain tasks. The service
acquired from an external supplier involves more or less only that service and not much more.
Acquiring intermediate inputs, however, involves the implicit outsourcing of a wider range of
tasks or services which are embodied in the production of the intermediate good.
2This is similar to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008b).
3An important literature has already explored the determinants of the make or buy decision
and highlights the importance of incomplete contracts theory, see in particular Grossman and
Helpman (2002). While these papers focus on the extensive margin of outsourcing, we are
interested in the intensive margin of o⁄shoring and the causes and e⁄ects of the ￿rm￿ s decision
about what tasks to produce inhouse and which it should outsource.
3models building on Dixit Stiglitz utility structures such as in Krugman (1980).
Welfare increases due to adjustments in task scope allowed by the emergence
of specialized service ￿rms. Finally, trade liberalization (as proxied by larger
population size), increases the level of specialization and aggregate productivity
through the same mechanisms. We focus most closely on the autarky equilib-
rium in the model and use country size as an indirect proxy for trade integration
but also analyse an open economy version of the model and speci￿cally the two
cases of (i) trade in ￿nal goods and (ii) trade in tasks.
We subsequently use detailed Swedish data which links employees to plants.
We know the occupation code of each individual in the data set and can there-
fore use the occupation codes as a proxy for how many tasks are performed at
each plant. We ￿nd that among manufacturers, plants in smaller cities tend to
perform more tasks inhouse than plants in larger cities when we control for plant
size. It therefore seems as if larger cities are characterized by more specializa-
tion as predicted by the model and which is in line with anecdotal evidence of
the presence of more specialized ￿rms in larger cities.
Moreover, the model is very close to one of the core arguments for trade and
economic integration in the ￿Wealth of Nations￿by Adam Smith. Smith argues
that the production becomes more e¢ cient when labour is divided such that
workers focus on speci￿c tasks instead of each worker doing the same thing.4
One example, described above, he mentions is that of a pin factory with ten
workers.5 One worker in the factory can probably make about ten pins per day.
However, if the workers divide the eighteen steps involved among them, the
total output by all workers of pins in one day could reach as high as 48,000 pins
because they become more e¢ cient when focusing on a more narrow range of
tasks. This is exactly the driving force in our model and, in fact, the only force
(since we have a ￿xed set of varieties) that drive gains from trade and larger
market size. When the market grows, manufacturing ￿rms decrease the scope
of tasks produced inhouse but instead expand output per good which spreads
the ￿xed cost over more output units. Specialists act in the same way and also
become more specialized. Ultimately, aggregate productivity increases as all
￿rms become more specialized (by producing fewer tasks inhouse) and therefore
also more e¢ cient.
4This is, obviously, an issue that has received much focus by economists, see, for example,
also Stigler (1951). However, to our knowledge, the issue has not been approached from this
perspective previously and especially not from an open economy perspective.
5Smith (1776), bk. V, ch. 1.
4We therefore also see our model as complementary to the recent literature of
productivity gains through the reallocation of production within industries, as
in Melitz (2003). While the ￿rm heterogeneity literature focuses on reallocation
of production across ￿rms (which have constant productivity) and productivity
gains which are external to the ￿rm, our model generates productivity gains
that are internal to the ￿rm.
Some important mechanisms of the model are in line with existing empirical
evidence regarding service o⁄shoring. First, there is by now some empirical
evidence that most developed economies are not only big insourcers of service
o⁄shoring, they are also net exporters of services, see Amiti and Wei (2005).
Therefore, service outsourcing cannot be explained only by the possibility to
source some tasks from low wage countries. In our model, service outsourcing
emerges from ￿rms￿need to focus on a narrow range of tasks; the marginal
cost of producing each task decreases for manufacturers and service providers.
This model is thus consistent with the existence of service outsourcing between
similar countries. Second, empirical ￿nding suggest that service o⁄shoring does
not appear to a⁄ect employment at home in a signi￿cantly negative way, see
Amiti and Wei (2005) and Ekholm and Hakkala (2006). One common argument
is that while an o⁄shored job can be a job loss, e¢ ciency gains stemming from
service o⁄shoring allow the ￿rm to expand which in turns has a positive e⁄ect
on productivity, see Amiti and Wei (2009).
In terms of theoretical work on the issue of task outsourcing and o⁄shoring,
several important contributions have already been made. Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008b) develop in a Heckscher Ohlin setting a model of north-south
trade in tasks where tasks di⁄er in how easy they are to o⁄shore. Most impor-
tantly, they identify a productivity e⁄ect at the industry level which raises the
return to the factors that are more easily moved o⁄shore. This model is similar
to ours in the sense that manufacturing production requires task inputs and that
these tasks consist of a ￿xed set arranged along a line. Our model, however,
does not di⁄erentiate between tasks and focuses instead on the case when ￿rms
become less e¢ cient the more di⁄erent in nature the tasks that are produced
inhouse are. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008a) also develop a model of
tasks o⁄shoring between similar countries but focus on economies of scale which
are external to the ￿rm. In our model, we propose a rather di⁄erent story. The
outsourcing of service tasks by manufacturing ￿rms to service providers raises
aggregate productivity by adjustments in tasks scope which lead to productivity
gains which are internal to the ￿rm.
5We believe, however, that the two theoretical papers closest to ours in terms
of modelling and focus are those by Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Antr￿s
and Helpman (2004). We view both of these papers as complementary to our
approach and we have tried to abstract from the issues analysed in these papers
and thereby focus explicitly on the channel which is unique for our model: the
fact that the set of tasks needed in production is ￿xed and that the task scope
of each ￿rm is endogenously determined. More speci￿cally, the former develop a
model with outsourcing where manufacturing ￿rms decide whether to outsource
all production or integrate vertically. In this model, manufacturers search for
suppliers with which to match and this gives rise to interesting interactions
between the relative mass of manufacturers versus suppliers. Our model, in
contrast, focuses more directly on the issue of specialization since the focus is
on the intensive scope margin rather than the extensive margin as is the point
of analysis in Grossman and Helpman (2002). In our setting, a narrower task
scope is the equivalent of greater specialization. Antr￿s and Helpman (2004)
develop, instead, a model in which manufacturers buy intermediate inputs and
where the set of intermediates purchased is endogenously determined. However,
we believe that since the set of inputs is not ￿xed, their model is more applicable
for manufacturing intermediate inputs rather than trade in tasks.
Finally, we believe that our model can explain two phenomena and be viewed
upon from two angles: (i) a model of trade in service inputs between service
suppliers and ￿nal good ￿rms (where trade liberalization is either proxied by
population size or by changes in intermediate trade costs); or (ii) a model ex-
plaining the economic geography of the supply of services, such as di⁄erent
degrees of specialization, aggregate productivity and the extent of outsourcing
in di⁄erent sectors or locations.
Section 2 describes the model we have developed. We then proceed to analyse
our setting in autarky which generates our most important results. Section 3
uses Swedish data linking employee with employers to test the main implications
of our model. Section 4 concludes. In the Appendix, we also analyse a more
complex open economy setting where we allow for trade in (i) goods or (ii) tasks.
62 Model
2.1 Setup in autarky
The model depicts an economy with a primary production factor labour, L,
which is used in all sectors. Production includes three sectors. The agricul-
tural sector is a Walrasian, homogenous-goods sector with costless trade. The
manufacturing sector is characterized by increasing returns, Dixit-Stiglitz mo-
nopolistic competition and iceberg trade costs. Finally, the service sector does
not produce any consumer good on its own, but instead produces tasks that it
sells to manufacturing ￿rms. The last category consists of the ￿rms to which
manufacturing ￿rms can outsource some of the tasks needed in manufacturing
production.
Consumers have two-tier utility functions with the upper tier (Cobb-Douglas)
determining the consumer￿ s division of expenditure among the sectors and the
second tier (CES) dictating the consumer￿ s preferences over the various di⁄er-
entiated varieties within the manufacturing sector.






where ￿ 2 (0;1), and CA is the consumption of the homogenous good. Manu-















N being the mass of varieties consumed, ci the amount of variety i consumed
and ￿ > 1 the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing goods.
Each consumer spends a share ￿ of his income on manufactures, and demand



























and is taken as given by each manufacturing ￿rm.
The unit factor requirement of the homogeneous good is one unit of labour.
This good is freely traded and since it is chosen as the numeraire
pA = w = 1; (4)
w being the nominal wage of workers. This also means that
Y = L.
Turning to production, manufacturing ￿rms require a range of tasks, indi-
cated by i and ranging from 0 to 1, to be performed in its production. This
range of tasks are arranged along a line and our intuition here is that tasks
located close to each other are more similar in nature. Along the same argu-
ment, the further away two tasks are, the more di⁄erent they are. To clarify
this point, we take again the example of the pin factory described by Adam
Smith. Consider the following three tasks: (i) hammering the pins so that they
are completely straight, (ii) hammering the end of the pin so that it has a ￿ at
end, (iii) cleaning the factory ￿ oor and, (iv) disposing of waste created in the
manufacturing process. This may be very stylized but tasks (i) and (ii) are most
likely much more similar in nature than say (i) and (iii). So in our case, (i) and
(ii) would be close to each other on the line and some distance away would be
(iii) and (iv) close to each other. When we refer to ￿similarity of tasks￿ , we
therefore essentially mean how close tasks are to each other in the task scope.
Manufacturing ￿rms face a marginal production cost per task j, e ’M (j),
which will depend on the task scope, and a ￿xed cost, fM. The cost of perform-
ing q (j) units of a task is
C (j) = wq (j) e ’M (j). (5)
The manufacturing ￿rm￿ s total cost is therefore:






￿ (j)q (j) e ’M (j)dj +
Outsourced goods
z }| { Z 1
0
(1 ￿ ￿ (j))q (j)pS (j)dj (6)
8where ￿ (j) 2 f0;1g. It is 1 if the ￿rm performs the task and 0 if it is outsourced.
If ￿rms do not perform the good inhouse it can procure the service from a
specializing ￿rm at the price pS (j). In other words, a manufacturing ￿rm can
either perform a task and pay we ’M (j) per unit or procure it from a specializing
￿rm at the price pS (j) per unit.6 Finally, one key assumption is that it is more
costly to produce multiple tasks if they lie far from each other in the task scope.
The marginal cost, e ’M (j), of task j increases in the average distance of task j
from all other tasks performed within the ￿rm
e ’M (j) =
R 1





where ￿ > 1 to attain a convex relationship between task scope and marginal
cost. Moreover, ￿ is restricted to the set of even numbers. This key assumption
is founded upon our belief that it is more costly for ￿rms to perform tasks of
very di⁄erent characteristics within the same ￿rm than to specialize in a more
narrow range of tasks. This is essentially how we capture Smith￿ s description
of the pin factory. A ￿rm that specialize in just a few tasks that are close
to each other in nature will be more productive than a ￿rm that does all the
tasks within its boundaries. A more modern justi￿cation for this could also
be an assumption of management supervision as a scarce resource. A manager
will ￿nd it easier to focus his or her time on a narrow set of tasks rather than
supervising a very broad range of tasks which di⁄er greatly in nature.
The parameter ￿ is therefore very important in our model. It is a measure
of how much more expensive it is to produce multiple tasks when they lie far
from each other; or, equivalently, how expensive it is for a ￿rm to operate a
wide task scope.
We also assume that all tasks have to be performed in the same level to




Due to the Leontief nature of the production function, cost minimization
means that the demand for each task, given the output level will be
q (j0) = q (j) = qM (9)
6In our model, outsourcing will not be modelled as paying a price p but rather as sharing
some of the revenues, but this will be clari￿ed shortly.
9where j 6= j0. What this means is that the level of each task input will equal
the output of the ￿nal good in equilibrium.
Now, we introduce service providers which are ￿rms that produce no ￿nal
goods but instead a set of tasks which they then sell to the ￿nal good producers.
Specializing ￿rms (service providers) need to pay two ￿xed costs. First, it pays
fS < fM. This is lower than the ￿xed cost for manufacturers since specializing
￿rms do not have to cover distribution and retails costs. However, as regards its
other costs it faces the same setup as manufacturers with a marginal cost per
task, e ’S (j), that increases in its average distance from all other tasks performed
within the specializing ￿rm. The total cost of the service provider l is therefore:
TCl = fS + w
Z 1
0
￿ (j)q (j) e ’l (j)dj (10)
where
e ’l (j) =
R 1





Especially important to note is that service providers (unlike manufacturing
￿rms) do not have to produce all tasks along the line from 0 to 1. Instead,
they choose a set of tasks, produce these tasks and then sell these tasks to
manufacturers. We believe that this feature is a key di⁄erence between the
supply of services versus intermediate inputs. An accounting ￿rm, for example,
focuses on a very narrow range of tasks in its production while a, for example,
car tyre producer still needs a wide range of tasks in order to produce. The
former would then be a typical service provider and the latter a typical provider
of an intermediate good.
To sum up, manufacturing is characterized by two types of ￿rms: manufac-
turers and service providers. Manufacturers produce ￿nal goods and produce
tasks inhouse or procure them from service providers. Service providers, on the
other hand, only produce tasks and sell these to manufacturing ￿rms.
All three sectors have free entry and ￿rms therefore make zero pro￿t in
equilibrium.
Finally, we have to make assumptions about the competition structure be-
tween, ￿rst, manufacturers and service providers and, second, between service
providers. Grossman and Helpman (2002) analyse in detail the case where the
matching of these types of ￿rms is characterized by search frictions and we
therefore wish to abstract from such frictions in order not to duplicate their re-
10sults and instead focus on our speci￿c mechanism. In our model, the sequence
of events will be as follows: (i) manufacturing ￿rms enter and decide on their
task scope. This process continues until their expected pro￿ts are driven to
zero. Since it will not be pro￿table for manufacturers to produce di⁄erent tasks
in our model (manufacturers are homogenous), we simply assume that they al-
ways produce task 0 inhouse and then all tasks from 0 and onwards until some
optimal level of tM < 1. (ii) Service providers enter one by one and position
themselves along the task scope (over the range of tasks that are outsourced)
until their expected pro￿ts are zero. This means that they divide the scope of
tasks not produced by manufacturers, j 2 (tM;1], between themselves. Since
service providers are identical it means that they will each produce a set of
tasks tS such that (1 ￿ tM) = nStS where nS denotes the number of service
providers. This setup is illustrated in ￿gure 1. (iii) Manufacturers make con-
tracts with task providers. This means, for example, that task providers install
their operations in the manufacturing ￿rm￿ s plants. The key assumption here is
that once the manufacturer and task provider have set up their joint operations,
the manufacturer cannot renege on the contract. Speci￿cally, we assume that a
task provider can produce tasks of di⁄erent quality and while the quantity can
be veri￿able by a court of law, the quality of the tasks cannot.7 Due to the
Leontief production function of the manufacturer, this gives the task provider
full bargaining power over the manufacturer since it can stop the manufacturer￿ s
production completely. (iv) Manufacturers and service providers bargain over
the revenues generated by production. As mentioned, the service provider has
full bargaining power and can therefore, as in Grossman and Helpman (2002),
determine the level of output of the manufacturer (by deciding which quality
of tasks to deliver, which indirectly determines the quantity). It subsequently
receives all the revenues generated by the speci￿c tasks it delivers.8 (v) Produc-
tion and consumption of manufacturing goods, agricultural goods and service
inputs take place.
Another important point to clarify is that while manufacturers optimize their
task scope, tM, to maximize pro￿ts, service suppliers￿task scope is determined
by free entry in their sector. We believe that this is reasonable given the fact
that if service providers can optimize their task scope, they would make positive
7This assumption is similar to that in Grossman and Helpman (2002).
8Grossman and Helpman (2002) assumes some exogenous bargaining power parameter of
the suppliers, !, but we assume here that service providers have full bargaining power over the
revenues generated by their speci￿c tasks. Our assumption is based on the fact that service
providers have the power to completely stop production in the manufacturer￿ s plant.
11Figure 1: The structure of task production.
pro￿ts in equilibrium and this cannot be the case if there is free entry for service
providers.
Figure 1 describes in detail how di⁄erent tasks in the economy are produced.
First, the tasks from 0 to tM are produced by each manufacturer inhouse. The
range of tasks from tM to 1 are then produced by service providers to which
manufacturers outsource. Since service providers are homogeneous, they divide
the range 1￿tM among themselves and each service providers therefore produces
tS = 1￿tM
nS tasks.
To sum up, the conditions used to close the model are:
1. Consumers maximize utility through consumption given their income.
2. Manufacturers maximize their pro￿ts by determining their task scope
(they take output as given since this is determined by the service providers as
explained).
3. Service providers maximize their pro￿ts by determining what quantity of
each task to produce (thereby also deciding on the output of the manufacturing
￿rm).
4. Zero pro￿ts for manufacturers due to free entry.
5. Zero pro￿ts for task providers due to free entry.
Together, these equations will determine the output level of each ￿nal good
and each task, q, the price of each ￿nal good, p, the task scope of manufacturers,
tM, the task scope of service providers, tS, the number of manufacturers, nM,
the number of service providers, nS, aggregate prices for manufacturing goods,
12P, and aggregate utility, UL.
Moreover, we restrict our analysis to equilibria with outsourcing taking place
to some extent. The analysis of the binary cases of complete outsourcing ver-
sus full vertical integration is already thoroughly analysed by Grossman and
Helpman (2002).
The following section will analyse the equilibrium of the model.
2.2 The autarky equilibrium
First, the total pro￿t of a manufacturing ￿rm is:
￿i = Ri ￿ Ci (12)
= piqi ￿ fM ￿
Z 1
0
￿i (j)qi (j) e ’i (j)dj ￿
Z 1
0
(1 ￿ ￿i (j))qi (j)pS (j)dj. (13)
The way the marginal cost increases in the di⁄erence between tasks means
that all ￿rms will produce tasks that are adjacent to each other. If the tasks are
ordered on a line between 0 and 1, we can, for simplicity, assume that the tasks
manufacturing ￿rms produce inhouse are in the range between 0 and tM, where
tM is determined endogenously. Moreover, due to the homogeneity of ￿rms, we
































This means that the average marginal cost for a manufacturing ￿rm, ’M (tM)





















where ￿1 ￿ 2
(￿+1)(￿+2). We note that the marginal cost of tasks produced inhouse
strictly increases in the scope of tasks that are produced inhouse.
Service providers face a similar structure such that
’S (tS) = ￿1t￿
S. (21)
Now, the demand of a manufacturing good (under a CES demand structure)








P 1￿￿ and P is the Dixit Stiglitz ideal price index.
The manufacturer produces a share tM of all tasks needed for production
inhouse. Due to the competition structure described above, it is the case that
manufacturers pay all the revenues generated by outsourced tasks to the service




to each supplier where nS = 1￿tM
tS is the mass of service providers in the econ-
omy. The total cost of the manufacturer for buying service inputs is therefore:
(1 ￿ tM)pMqM.
The pro￿ts of a manufacturer can then be rewritten as:
￿M = pMqM ￿ tM’M (tM)qM ￿ (1 ￿ tM)pMqM ￿ fM (24)
= tMqM (pM ￿ ’M (tM)) ￿ fM. (25)
A supplier produces tS tasks taking demand q = Ap
￿￿
M and the scope of
manufacturers tM as given. At this point, it also takes its own scope, tS, as
given. Since the supplier will have the same output of a task as the manufacturer
14will have of its ￿nal good, due to the Leontief production function in (8), we
denote output of both items simply as q where q = qM = qS.
Per manufacturer customer, it gets paid (1 ￿ tM) tS
1￿tM pMq = tSpMq. Its
costs are fS + tS’S (tS)q. Therefore its operating pro￿t (denoted by ￿S) from
dealing with one manufacturer is:
￿S = tSq (pM ￿ ’S (tS)). (26)
It faces the problem of how much intermediate inputs to produce (knowing
that it can completely control the output of the manufacturer):
max
q





￿ ￿ tS’S (tS)q (28)









where e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿1.
This gives the optimal output for a supplier given its own scope and the
manufacturer￿ s scope. Note that our assumption is that the manufacturer (due
to the holdup problem) has to accept the output volume chosen by the sup-
pliers if it decides to outsource task production. We also note that the service
supplier produces more if demand is high (high A) and less if its task scope
is large (high tS) since the price of its good in this case will be higher due to
its lower productivity (higher marginal cost). As expected, a high elasticity of
substitution makes output more sensitive to marginal costs.
The manufacturer faces the following pro￿t function:





￿ tM ￿ ￿1t
￿+1
M q ￿ fM. (31)







￿ tM ￿ ￿1t
￿+1
M q ￿ fM, (32)














The solution for tM above gives the solution for a manufacturer￿ s optimal
scope given the quantity produced by each intermediate supplier. We know the








where e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿:1. This means that there is a monotonic and linear relationship
between the task scope of a manufacturer and that of the service suppliers.
The reason for this is simply that a higher task scope of service providers, tS,
make them less specialized and therefore less e¢ cient. Less e¢ cient service
providers are not as attractive for the manufacturer to use for outsourcing and
the manufacturer then prefers to perform relatively more production inhouse
and raises tM.
Now, we turn to the free entry condition in the manufacturing sector and
the fact that they earn zero pro￿ts in equilibrium:
￿M = 0 (35)















which returns a relationship between A, the demand per ￿rm in the economy,
and tS, the task scope of suppliers, and indirectly that of manufacturers too
from (34), in the economy.
There is free entry for service providers too and this will drive down their
task scope, tS, such that they earn zero pro￿ts in equilibrium:
￿S = 0 (38)














16The free entry conditions yield a solution for the number of manufacturing
￿rms, nM, and this consists only of exogenous parameters. This is an important
conclusion, especially that this variable is independent of population size which
is otherwise the case with CES preferences, and we will see later that this means
that there is no ￿variety e⁄ect￿ from trade. The reason for nM being ￿xed,
however, stems from the fact that all surplus pro￿ts coming from an expansion
in market size are passed on to the service suppliers and do not stay with the
manufacturing ￿rms. This result is similar to what is found in Grossman and
Helpman (2002).




















e ￿ ￿ 1
(42)
where we note one of our key ￿ndings, that larger economies are more special-
ized. This is due to the fact that as population increases, the demand per each
manufacturing variety increases. This leads to an expansion of output of each
manufacturing variety since the number of varieties is ￿xed as was observed in
(40). This also means an increase in the output of each task raising the pro￿ts
of each service provider which leads to an in￿ ow of new service ￿rms in the econ-
omy. This entry process drives down the task scope of each service provider.
Ultimately, this means that a larger economy consists of more specialized ￿rms.


































































































which gives the following price per manufacturing good:





e ￿ ￿ 1
￿￿
. (48)




















We focus especially on the result in (46) which gives the expression for the
price index of the manufacturing goods. This is important since welfare can be
expressed by:
W = P￿￿ (51)
since the agricultural good is the numeraire and (51) therefore gives the real
wage in the economy. The exponent for L in the expression for P is, in this
model, no longer 1
1￿￿ like in Krugman (1980) or other similar models building
on CES preferences, but instead ￿￿ so it is still negative but this comes through
a specialization e⁄ect rather than a variety e⁄ect; the elasticity is ￿ rather than
1
￿￿1. This outcome is a direct consequence of our new mechanism in this model.
We therefore have a new margin of how welfare increases in market size. This
margin is stronger the more di¢ cult it is for ￿rms to manage many tasks because
18this makes specialization relatively more important.




















Moreover, the ￿market size per ￿rm￿ , A, changes with country size by the
elasticity ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿1 which can be either positive or negative. It increases with
population size if specialization is important or if there is strong competition
between manufacturing goods (higher elasticity of substitution).
Theorem 1 Larger economies are associated with more specialization, higher
aggregate productivity, lower prices and higher welfare. The elasticity of these
relationships is greater the higher is the cost for ￿rms to engage in many tasks
simultaneously.
Theorem 2 Trade liberalization leads to: a) increased specialization of ￿rms
and b) higher welfare due to greater e¢ ciency in production.
Theorem 2 follows from Theorem 1 if it is assumed that trade liberalization
can be proxied by an increase in population.
Smith (1776) argued that a division of labour could generate a great increase
in production. One example he used was the making of pins. One worker could
probably make only twenty pins per day. However, if ten people divided up the
eighteen steps required to make a pin, they could make a combined amount of
48,000 pins in one day.
The exact equivalent in our model would be a decrease in tM and tS which
makes ￿rms more productive at what they do. Working against this mechanism
is the presence of ￿xed costs (in Smith￿ s example this would be a ￿xed cost per
step in the specialization process). The presence of ￿xed costs makes it possible
for larger economies to engage in more specialization (because consumption is
larger and we have a ￿xed set of varieties which causes larger economies to
consume more of each variety). This also, interestingly, translates into higher
aggregate productivity in larger economies since the marginal cost per output
decreases. To summarize, the equivalent in our model of Smith￿ s division of
labour in the pin factory is the division of production into more specialized
19service ￿rms. In Smith￿ s economy, greater size made it possible for workers
to specialize more, in our model it makes it possible for service providers to
specialize more. The ￿nal outcome is equivalent for the two settings: larger




The most important testable prediction of our model is Theorem 1: larger
economies are characterized by more specialization and a more narrow task
scope performed inside the ￿rm￿ s boundaries. A convincing empirical test would
therefore require information on ￿rms and which tasks they decide to perform
inhouse. We therefore use Swedish data which links employees to plants. Among
the observables in the dataset on individuals is what occupation each individual
has. This is the variable which we use as a proxy of a task. We link employees
to plants and by calculating how many di⁄erent occupations the employees of
each plant have, we get a proxy of how many tasks are performed inside the
organization.9 For each plant, we know its main business (sector by NACE
codes) and its location (by city) and can therefore test whether plants in larger
cities tend to perform fewer tasks inhouse.
3.2 Data
As stated, we use Swedish data (all data is from Statistics Sweden) from the
year of 2005. For our purposes, we believe that a crossectional approach is
superior to using a panel estimation and therefore choose to use data only
from a single year. 2,563,771 individuals are included in the dataset and this
comprises all individuals employed in the private sector in Sweden in 2005.
413,387 plants are included and these are operated by 381,087 ￿rms indicating
that the vast majority of ￿rms only operate one plant. For individuals, we use
their occupation code and which plant they are employed at. For plants, we use
information on how many employees they have, their location (by city/commune
of which there are 290 in Sweden) and their sector (by ￿ve digit NACE codes).
9We do not have speci￿c information on traditional task measures but instead occupations
of workers. We believe, however, that the type of outsourcing described in the model is more
related to occupations rather than speci￿c tasks.
203.3 Method and results
As already described, we intend to test the hypothesis that plants in larger
cities are more specialized (that they have a more narrow task scope). We will
do this at the plant level so that we can exploit all the variation that we have
and control for sector ￿xed e⁄ects. Moreover, larger plants tend to be more
diversi￿ed so we control for plant size as well. Plant size is here proxied for
by how many employees each plant has. The main speci￿cation that we run is
therefore:
logtijl = ￿0 + ￿1 logPopj + ￿2 logSizeijl + fl + "ijl (54)
where tijl denotes how many occupations employees have at plant i in city j in
sector l, Popj denotes the population of city j and Sizeijl denotes how many
employees plant i has. Due to the logarithmic functions used, we can interpret
coe¢ cients ￿1 and ￿2 as elasticities. We control for sectors at the two or three
digit NACE level as shown here by fl. We cluster for standard errors at the city
level in all regressions.
Table 1 shows the results. The ￿rst column estimates the regression in (54)
using all manufacturing plants in Sweden in 2005. We ￿nd that the elasticity
with respect to city size is indeed negative and signi￿cant: smaller city size
tends to make plants hire a wider scope of occupations. This con￿rms the main
prediction of our model, that larger cities are associated with a greater degree
of specialization.
We then run a series of robustness tests for this speci￿cation. First, we
note that many plants have very few employees and we therefore retain only
the plants with more employees than the median plant (the median plant has 6
employees) in column (2). Then, in (3), we remove all plants that have less than
the median number of occupations inhouse. This is equivalent to retaining only
the plants with the most number of occupations inhouse. In column (4) we focus
on the fact that some sectors could be substantially concentrated geographically.
Our method here is then to retain in the sample only those sectors which are
above the median sector as regards geographical coverage (as measured by the
number of cities in which the sector is active). Finally, we use ￿xed e⁄ect at
a more detailed sectoral level (three digit NACE instead of two digit). None
of the robustness tests removes the conclusion from column (1): that ￿rms in
larger cities are associated with fewer occupations inhouse.
21It should also be noted that our prior on task scope and plant size is highly
signi￿cant and has a relatively high elasticity.
We conclude that this main empirical speci￿cation largely con￿rms the main
prediction of the model and most importantly it does so for the manufacturing
sector which is the sector we mostly had in mind when building the model and
most likely the sector with most variation in task scope.
4 Conclusions
We develop a model of service outsourcing in which ￿rms can choose how many
tasks they wish to perform inhouse and how many to source from an external
￿rm. Our key assumption is that it is more costly for ￿rms to perform a wider
range of tasks inhouse and that there therefore are bene￿ts from specialization
in a narrower range of tasks. Speci￿cally, we allow service providers to focus
on a narrow range of tasks and then sell these tasks to producers of ￿nal goods
(manufacturers). The narrower is the scope of a service provider, the more
productive it is. The same applies for manufacturers, the fewer tasks it produces
inhouse, the more productive it is. We assume that there is a contracting friction
due to a lack of legal veri￿ability of the quality of tasks provided by service ￿rms
and a holdup problem since a manufacturing ￿rm cannot switch service provider
once a contract has been made. This causes manufacturing ￿rms to share their
revenues with service providers.
The model generates analytical solutions for all variables and, most impor-
tantly, dynamics relating to market size: larger economies can sustain a greater
degree of specialization since larger demand can make more ￿rms a⁄ord the ￿xed
costs involved in production while operating a narrower task scope. If trade lib-
eralization is proxied by an increase in population size, the model generates
bene￿ts from trade through a rise in specialization rather than an increase in
the number of varieties (despite the fact that we use Dixit Stiglitz preferences).
We use detailed data from Sweden which links employees to plants. We
￿nd that, controlling for plant size, manufacturing plants in larger cities tend to
employ fewer occupations. It therefore seems as if manufacturing ￿rms are more
specialized in larger economies, possibly due to larger bene￿ts from outsourcing.
We also model two cases of incremental trade liberalization where we develop
a two country model with iceberg trade costs for (i) goods and (ii) tasks. Goods












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23eralization actually lowers the degree of specialization. We view, however, using
the autarky model and proxying trade liberalization by an increase in the pop-
ulation as the cleanest way of modelling trade liberalization.
Finally, we believe that our model lies close to the heart of Adam Smith￿ s
theory of the bene￿ts of the ￿division of labour￿ . In Smith￿ s theory, a larger
economy, or ￿rm, could divide tasks to di⁄erent workers who raised their pro-
ductivity substantially when specializing in these tasks. The equivalent in our
model of service trade is that, in larger markets, manufacturing ￿rms outsource
more tasks to service providers which specialize in a more narrow range of tasks
and become more productive in these tasks. The outcome is that larger markets,
or markets engaging in trade liberalization, experience a rise in specialization
which translates into higher aggregate productivity and welfare.
245 Appendix: Open economy
This ￿nal section of the paper explores the open economy case in a slightly
di⁄erent way. In Section 2 we analysed the autarky setting and then proxied
trade liberalization by an increase in population size. While this gives the
analytically most robust, clearest and most intuitive results, we also wish to
examine what happens in the case of incremental trade liberalization. We do
this in this section.
We will explore two types of open economy settings. First, we will allow
for trade in manufactured goods but not in tasks. This can be seen as a world
with trade in ￿nal goods but where service trade is impossible due to too high
trade costs for services. Trade costs are represented by an iceberg trade cost of
￿ > 1. Second, we open, instead, trade in tasks which can be seen as an analysis
of the recent rapid increase of service o⁄shoring. The friction in task trade is
represented by an iceberg trade cost of ￿ > 1. As the notation suggests, the
way we model is similar to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008b). We will, for
now, maintain the assumption of equal wages across countries. Moreover, we
will demonstrate our results in an economy consisting of two countries, Home
and Foreign, where the latter is indicated by an asterix ￿￿￿ .
In order to maintain tractability and illustrate our main points, we assume
symmetric country size. We are therefore abstracting from e⁄ects relating to
economic geography and di⁄erences in relative country size.
5.1 Trade in goods
When there is trade in goods, the demand faced by each manufacturing ￿rm in
country i selling to country j is instead:










































Now, the pro￿ts of a manufacturer in Home are:












tM ￿ tM’M (q + ￿q￿) ￿ fM (61)
where it should be noted that, for the foreign market, the manufacturing ￿rm
has to produce ￿q￿ in order to sell q￿ on the foreign market.
A supplier decides how much to produce for the manufacturing ￿rm, q+￿q￿,
by maximizing its operating pro￿t ￿S per manufacturing ￿rm:












￿ tS’S (tS)(q + ￿q￿). (63)






















(A + ￿A￿) (66)
where ￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿ 2 (0;1] is an index of ￿globalization￿and takes the value 0 in
autarky and 1 at free trade.














tM ￿ tM’M (q + ￿q￿) ￿ fM (67)





￿ + A￿ 1
￿q￿
￿￿1
￿ = (q + ￿q￿)(￿ + 1)￿1t￿
M (68)
e ￿￿1t￿









which is the same relationship between tM and tS as in the autarky model.
Now, we turn to the zero pro￿t condition for manufacturers:
￿M = 0 (71)
























This expression for the market size can be used in the zero pro￿t condition
for service suppliers:














where we see that the mass of manufacturers is ￿xed in each country (as in


























































































































Imposing size symmetry, L
































￿ = 1 (84)
where we note that t = t￿ is a solution.
Moreover,











when country size is the same. This also means that the prices are:




S (1 + ￿)
1
1￿￿ . (87)



























e ￿ ￿ 1
.
Note that with no di⁄erence in country size, the level of specialization of both
service providers and manufacturing ￿rms is exactly the same as in autarky and
independent of trade costs.































S (1 + ￿)
1
1￿￿ (92)























So all the welfare e⁄ects from trade liberalization comes from the fact that
more varieties become available and that their price falls as trade becomes less
costly, captured by the fall in the term (1 + ￿)
1
1￿￿ when ￿ increases.
Theorem 3 Trade liberalization in goods trade does not a⁄ect the degree of
specialization or the mass of ￿rms. It does generate welfare e⁄ects, however,
through the decrease in price of import goods.
29Moreover, all the e⁄ects from country size (L and L￿) are identical to the
autarky case and do not change with trade in goods.
5.2 Trade in tasks
Now we turn instead to the case when tasks can be traded internationally. Here,
we face some di¢ cult decisions about what assumptions to use. This depends
on the fact that, in autarky, all outsourced tasks are produced in both countries
by local service providers. In perfectly free trade, however, no service provider
will produce the same task, regardless of where it is located. Therefore, we
have decided to analyse the case of some intermediate trade cost where service
providers are specializing internationally (meaning that only one service provider
in the world will produce each task which is outsourced). Moreover, we will
analyse the symmetric country case where L = L￿ = L to ensure that tM = t￿
M
because of the di¢ culties in dealing with how the tasks that are between tM
and t￿
M are produced (only a subset of service providers would be a⁄ected in
this case and behave di⁄erently).
To model trade frictions in tasks, we assume a standard iceberg cost of ￿ > 1
where for one unit of a task to arrive in the foreign economy, ￿ units have to be
produced by the service provider.
The pro￿ts of a manufacturer are unchanged with respect to our baseline
model:
￿M = pq ￿ tM’M (q) ￿ (1 ￿ tM)pq ￿ fM. (94)
The pro￿t of a service provider has, however, changed. When it is selling to
a domestic manufacturer, the problem is still the same but consider the service
provider￿ s pro￿ts for exporting its task:
￿X
S = tSp￿q￿ ￿ ￿tS’S (tS)q￿ (95)





￿ ￿ ￿’S (tS)
￿
. (97)














Since manufacturers now buy from both domestic and foreign suppliers, it
means that they will have less production than before by a factor of ￿￿￿ < 1
(also domestic service provider will produce this lower output for manufacturers
due to the Leontief structure of the manufacturers￿production function).
The manufacturer￿ s problem is now:











































which is the same as in the autarky except for the presence of ￿. This is because
service providers now become more expensive to use due to the cost of ￿ to ship
some tasks. Here, we also assume that it is the specialization level of foreign
service providers which will bound q because the foreign service providers are
the ones who face the iceberg trade cost ￿ of shipping tasks.
Now, we use the free entry condition for manufacturers:
















1 (1 + ￿)
1
￿ 1 + ￿
￿
= A. (107)
31The free entry condition for service providers in Home yields:
￿S = 0 (108)
tS (nMpq + n￿
Mp￿q￿) ￿ tS’S (tS)(nMq + n￿






































￿ = fS. (110)



























2e ￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)
. (112)
where we note that 2e ￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿) is always positive since e ￿ > 1.
This solution can be equaled to the solution in (107):
t
￿￿(￿￿1)￿1
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2e ￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)
￿
=
2e ￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿ (2e ￿ ￿ 1)
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1+￿
￿ (2e ￿ ￿ 1)






￿ (2e ￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)) ￿ 1
(2e ￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿))
2 . (118)
This is negative if
1
￿




(1 + ￿). (120)
To ￿nd the remaining variables, we use the expression for nM and the de￿-
nition of A ￿
￿L






































2e ￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)
.
This shows that specialization decreases when task trade is liberalized (@tS
@￿ <








2e ￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)
.







fSe ￿2. We note that tM increases with trade liberaliza-
tion (d￿ < 0) because tS increases but also decreases (due to the extra term
￿
1
￿) because now the quantity supplied by foreign service providers increases.





























The elasticity of the price index with respect to country size is the same as
before, ￿. The net e⁄ect of ￿, the cost of task trade, is, however, uncertain.
This is most likely due to the two main channels through which ￿ a⁄ects these
variables: (i) a lower ￿ increases specialization which lowers the price index and
increases welfare but (ii) a lower ￿ increases the output of each manufacturer
which lowers the range of varieties available in the economy. The net e⁄ect
ultimately depends on the relative size of ￿ and ￿ or whether the preference for
variety (￿) is stronger than the need for specialization (￿).
Theorem 4 Trade liberalization in task trade decreases the level of specializa-
tion among both service providers and manufacturing ￿rms. The net e⁄ect on
the range of manufacturing varieties and welfare is, however, uncertain.
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